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a b s t r a c t
Webuild a dynamic equilibriummodel of a durable goods oligopolywith a competitive secondarymarket
to evaluate the bias in estimating the structural parameters of demand and supply when durability
is omitted. We simulate data from our dynamic model and use them to estimate the model’s static
counterpart. We find that the static estimate of the elasticity of demand is an overestimate of the true
elasticity and that the static estimate of themarkup is an underestimate. Our results provide a benchmark
on the magnitude and sign of the bias when static models are used for economic inference.1. Introduction
Durability and secondary markets affect the behavior of profit-
maximizing oligopolistic firms by making their decision problems
dynamic and thus modifying their price and quantity choices.
In this paper, we seek to quantify the bias in estimating the
structural parameters of the model when omitting durability and
secondary markets. Our approach is to obtain simulated data from
our dynamic durable-goods model and then use these data to
estimate the static counterpart of the model that omits durability.
Our goal is to quantify and sign the bias in estimating the structural
parameters of demand and technology.
Durability and secondary markets create dynamics in the
problems of consumers and firms. As a durable good, the product
is an asset which consumers can either use over multiple
periods, delaying their return to the primary market, or choose
to scrap and purchase a replacement. The consumers’ decisions –
whether to delay or to purchase – depend on their expectations
on future primary market prices, which create forward-looking
dynamics in the demand function and thus on the firms’
decision problems. However, with a frictionless secondarymarket,
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(S. Esteban), mshum@caltech.edu (M. Shum).consumers can fully recover the value of their investment by
trading their asset in the secondary market in every period,
making unnecessary their choice between delay and purchase
and thus eliminating the forward-looking dependence of current
demand on future expected primary market prices. However, with
secondary markets, forward-looking dependence remains present
through the implicit rental price: consumers pay for the one-
period use of the asset the difference between its current price
and the expected resale price in the following period, which yields
the dependence of demand on expected future secondary market
prices and on expected future primary market prices as new and
used goods are substitutes in consumption.
As pointed out by Coase (1972), the forward-looking depen- 
dence in the demand function creates dynamics in the problem of 
firms and is a source of time inconsistency: the firm can raise its 
profits by announcing high future primary market prices (low pro- 
duction levels) since this will drive up expected secondary market 
prices and positively increase the consumers’ current willingness 
to pay for new goods, which allows the firm to raise current prices.1 
Nonetheless, consumers are rational and anticipate that after cur- 
rent profits have been earned, the firm wants to revise its previ- 
ous announcement, by lowering current prices (raising output),
1 The Coase conjecture states that, if the good is infinitely durable, does not
depreciate, and the firm can adjust price instantaneously, a monopolist prices
immediately at marginal cost.1
and thus behaves time inconsistently. In this paper, we assume
consumers possess rational expectations and characterize the time
consistent equilibrium.2
In addition to forward-looking dependence, the secondary 
market also creates the dependence of demand on past output 
as it trades in the contemporaneous secondary market and 
becomes a source of competition for the firm. The competitive 
pressure created by the secondary market will reduce the firm’s 
output. Liang (1999) points out that this reduction in future output 
results in a production strategy closer to the full commitment 
solution.
In this paper, we build a full equilibrium time consistent 
dynamic oligopoly model of a durable goods market – the car 
market – which accounts for the durability of the product, its trade 
in active secondary markets and the forward-looking behavior of 
both consumers and firms. We simulate data for the structural 
dynamic model drawing from the calibrated parameter values in 
Chen et al. (2007). We then measure and sign the bias in 
estimating the structural parameters of the model while 
neglecting durability and secondary markets by estimating the 
deep parameters of demand and technology with a static model.
An advantage of our data-generating approach,which is feasible
because of having a full equilibrium model of demand and supply,
is that the truth is ‘‘known’’ to us, which gives us a well-
defined comparison point to evaluate the biases in our parameter
estimates. Alternatively, we could have estimated the dynamic
and static versions of the model and compared the estimated
parameter values. However, in this case all we could say is that the
estimates are different, but we could not make statements on the
relative accuracy of the approaches.
Our results show that ignoring dynamics leads to upwardly-
biased (in absolute terms) estimates of the demand elasticities
and downwardly-biased estimates of the markup. The markup
bias is larger in magnitude that the elasticity of demand bias,
which suggests that a correct specification of the firms’ behavior
is important when drawing policy implications for durable-goods
markets. Additionally, given the computation and data constraints
in estimating full equilibrium dynamic models, our results shed
light on themagnitude and sign of the biaseswhenhaving to obtain
economic inference from static models.
To summarize, the main contribution of our work is to quantify
and sign the biases for supply of estimating static models. As
already shown in the literature, the demand-side estimates will
be biased if we estimate models that ignore forward-looking
dynamics. The estimates on the supply-side, however, the firms’
markups, will also be biased because both the demand elasticities
are mismeasured and because the first-order conditions to the
firms’ problem are incorrectly specified since the firms’ problems
are forward looking.
1.1. Literature overview
Our work relates to the literature seeking to quantify the biases
when estimating static models that are misspecified because the
characteristics of the product make the problems of consumers
and firms inherently dynamic, as it is the case for durable goods.3
2 There is a large theoretical literature analyzing how durability erodes market 
power and validating the Coase conjecture: see Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), 
Bond and Samuelson (1984), Bulow (1982), Gul et al. (1986) and Stokey (1981). See 
Waldman (2003) for a recent survey of the durable-goods literature.
3 Other papers have studied markets that have dynamics similar to those of 
durable goods (for example, goods for which there is satiation in consumption and 
storables) and have also quantified, with demand-side models, the bias that results 
when the model estimated is static. Hartmann (2006) studies an intertemporal 
satiation problem (playing golf); Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Sun et al. (2003) look 
at markets where consumers can store and hold inventories of the good.Overall, we differ from the existing literature in our focus on both
the demand and supply side biases and on our approach to quantify
them.4 Having a full equilibriummodel allows us to take a different
approach – a simulation/estimation approach – to measure the
misspecification bias.
Our approach is similar to the one taken in Sun et al. (2003) 
who analyze the bias in a storable goods market by simulating 
data with a dynamic model and estimating a myopic version of it. 
Also in this literature, Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2006) build a 
demand-side model of the DVD market (an example of a durable 
good) and estimate the dynamic and static versions of the model.5 
They find that the static model tries to explain the consumers’ 
delay when purchasing by increasing the variance for the 
valuation of DVDs. Carranza (2007) also estimates dynamic and 
static demand-side models of the digital cameras market and finds 
that ignoring dynamics results in low estimates for the taste 
parameters. Gordon (2006) estimates a demand-side model with 
uncertain product quality and price changes. He finds that the 
estimation of a model without forward-looking consumers 
underestimates price elasticities.
A different approach in accounting for the importance of 
dynamics is taken by Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) and Melnikov 
(2000) who quantify the importance of forward looking dynamics 
by estimating the discount factor (or inferring it from the 
parameter estimates). Both find evidence of consumers being 
forward looking. Erdem et al. (2003) estimate a dynamic demand- 
model of stock-piling behavior and find that the estimated 
elasticities depend on how current price changes affect the 
expectations on future price changes.
Our work also relates to the growing literature estimating 
demand-side models of durable goods,6 Adda and Cooper (2000b), 
Adda and Cooper (2000a),7 Gordon (2006), Song and Chintagunta 
(2003), Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2006), Carranza (2007), 
Gordon (2006), Berkovec (1985), Rust (1985) and Stolyarov (2002), 
with some papers accounting for transaction costs, in which 
consumers solve an optimal stopping problem, and secondary 
markets.8 Overall, compared to this literature, the complexity 
added by having a supply side problem forces us to simplify the 
heterogeneity in demand.
Esteban and Shum (2007), Suslow (1986), Porter and Sattler 
(1999) and Ramey (1989) derive and estimate full equilibrium 
models of durable goods that incorporate a supply side problem 
but have to rely on simpler demand environments than ours.9 Most
4 One exception is Esteban (1999) which measures, at a theoretical level, the 
difference in the imputed parameters if one were to estimate a static model while 
the data was generated by a dynamic monopoly durable-goods model. The results 
are derived for a simplified version of the model in Esteban and Shum (2007).
5 Endogenous product characteristics also yield dynamics in the problems of 
consumers and firms: consumers decides whether to purchase now or delay based 
on their expectation on future quality adjustments, which creates the forward 
looking dependence on demand that is responsible for the firms’ consistency 
problems. Wang (2007) studies empirically this problem assuming that consumers 
do not have any foresight about the evolution of prices and characteristics.
6 The rich complexity of the automobile industry has resulted in an extensive 
literature addressing questions other than the dynamics resulting from the 
durability of the product. Therefore, papers like Bresnahan (1987), Berry et al. 
(1995), Goldberg (1995), Petrin (2002) and Clerides (2003), among others, have 
employed full equilibrium models without forward-looking behavior in the 
problem of consumers and firms.
7 This paper incorporates firms but the market is perfectly competitive.
8 The importance of the adverse selection problem that arises from secondary 
markets has also been analyzed in the literature: see Akerlof (1970), Hendel and 
Lizzeri (1999), House and Leahy (2000) and Bond (1982) for an empirical 
contribution.
9 Carlton and Gertner (1989) analyzes the theoretical implications of mergers on 
oligopolistic durable goods producers. Esteban (2002) analyzes the implications of 
imperfect competition on the dynamics of market aggregates. Iizuka (2007) 
estimates a reduced-form model of the textbook market where new editions are 
introduced to kill-off the secondary market.2
closely related to our present work is Tanaka (2007) and Chen et al. 
(2007) who alleviate the problems of restricting the demand- side 
problem by assuming logit-demand models, where the former 
allows for persistent time-varying production costs while the latter 
incorporates transaction costs (relating closer to the demand-side 
literature). Nair (2004) estimates a dynamic full equilibrium model 
of demand and supply without secondary markets of the console- 
video game market, where consumers solve an optimal stopping 
problem. Carranza (2008) estimates a full equilibrium of the digital 
cameras market where the dynamics arise from the firms deciding 
whether to introduce new models. Goettler and Gordon (2008) 
estimate a dynamic model of durable goods where firms make 
dynamic pricing and investment decisions to improve the product.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the dynamic
model. Section 2 addresses the parameterization of the data-
generating dynamic model and Section 4 evaluates the estimation
biases when omitting durability. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
Consider a durable goods oligopolistic industry with a sec-
ondarymarket. Both firms and consumers are forward looking. The
model is cast in discrete time and has an infinite horizon. In what
follows, we use the car industry to illustrate our model.
The life of a car consists of J stages, starting with being ‘‘new’’.
We assume all new cars are homogeneous. The only characteristic
of a car is its quality, and when a car depreciates from one stage to
the next, its quality deteriorates. To simplify the state space while
keeping the differentiation structure between new and used cars,
we assume that cars differ in their quality only when they are of
different stages, so that all cars of the same stage are homogeneous
even if they are produced by different firms. Let αj > 0, for j =
1, . . . , J , denote the cars’ qualities in different stages. Let ‘‘0’’ index
the outside good, or ‘‘no car’’, and normalize the quality of the
outside good as α0 = 0.
In the car industry, as in many other durable good industries, a
product lives formany periods, where a period is defined by a year.
In fact, the average age of cars in theUSwas 9 years according to the
2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). As a result, at any
point in time the number of used cars in existence is many times
larger than that of new cars. This creates a modeling difficulty in
the dynamic framework: if each stage of a car’s life corresponds
to one period, and if we model cars as living for many periods by
having a large J (for example, J = 9 or above), then the state space
is huge and the heavy computational burden makes the model
intractable. Instead, if we have a small J (for example, J = 2
or 3), then the number of used cars in existence is only slightly
larger than that of new cars, which is far from reality and makes
calibration impossible.
To address this problem, we assume stochastic depreciation
of used cars, that is, at the end of each period, each used car
depreciates into the next stage with probability δ ∈ (0, 1).
Formally, at the end of each period, goods (cars or the outside good)
depreciate according to the transition function
d(j) =

0 if j = 0,
2 if j = 1,
jwith probability 1− δ, and j+ 1 with probability δ
if j = 2, . . . , J − 1,
J with probability 1− δ, and 0 with probability δ
if j = J .
(1)
Here d(j) denotes the next-period’s index of a good that is
currently indexed by j, j = 0, 1, . . . , J . The depreciation of the
outside good (to itself) and of new cars (to second-stage cars),
i.e., just used cars, is deterministic, whereas the depreciation of
used cars into different used car of different stages is stochastic.With stochastic depreciation of used cars, even if J is small, the
number of used cars in existence can still be much larger than that
of newcars, fitting the empirical observation, and yet there is only a
small number of aggregate state variables, whichmakes themodel
tractable.
On the supply side, the marginal cost of producing new cars is
the same across firms and constant in output, with an industry-
wide cost shock in each period. Specifically, the marginal cost in
period t for each firm is
ct = c¯ + vt , (2)
where vt is the i.i.d. cost shock,
vt =
{−c˜ with probability ρ,
0 with probability 1− 2ρ,
c˜ with probability ρ,
(3)
with c¯ and c˜ being positive constants, c˜ < c¯ , and ρ ∈ (0, 1). The
cost shock introduces randomness into the model at the aggregate
level, so that there are fluctuations in the simulated price and
quantity data, which will be needed for the estimation.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each
period, consumers inherit either used cars or the outside good from
their decisions in the previous period, and the cost shock is realized
and known to all agents. Then firms and consumers simultaneously
make production and purchase/sale decisions, whereby firms
obtain per-period profits and consumers enjoy per-period utility
from consumption. At the end of each period, goods depreciate and
a new period arrives.
2.1. Consumers’ problem
There is a continuum of consumers of size M , with a generic
consumer denoted by i. Consumers are heterogeneous in their
valuations of goods, which perturb their choices of goods in every
period. Let Eit ≡
(
i0t , i1t , . . . , iJt
)
be the vector of idiosyncratic
shocks of consumer i for period t , with ijt being i.i.d. across (i, j, t).
We let rit = 0, 2, . . . , J denote the index of the good (used cars
or the outside good) owned by the consumer i at the beginning
of period t . Because depreciation takes place at the end of each
period, at the beginning of each period, before purchasing, no
consumer owns a new car, so rit 6= 1, ∀i, ∀t . We let Kjt , for
j = 0, 1, . . . , J , denote the fraction of consumers in the population
who own good j at the beginning of period t , with K1t = 0 by
construction, and define the vector EBt = (K2t , . . . , KJt)′ to be the
vector of used car stocks at the beginning of period t . Note that
K0t = 1− (K2t + · · · + KJt).
To write the consumers’ problem in a dynamic programming
framework, we define the aggregate and individual states as
follows. The aggregate state is EBt and ct . For a consumer iwho owns
rit ∈ {0, 2, . . . , J} at the beginning of period t , the individual state
consists of EBt , ct , rit , Ept and Eit . Given the individual state, consumer
i’s period-t utility if she chooses sit ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} for consumption
is
u(sit , rit , Eit , Ept) = αsit + γ ·
(
prit t − psit t
)+ isit t , (4)
where γ measures the consumer’s marginal utility of money, Ept =
(p0t , p1t , . . . , pJt) is the price vector in period t , and pjt denotes the
price of good j in period t , with the convention that p0t = 0 for all t .
In the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), the aggregate state
transition is given by EB′ = H∗(EB, c), and the mapping from
the aggregate state to current prices is given by Ep = G∗(B, c),
where both are functions of the MPE equilibrium decision rules.
Therefore, in equilibrium, consumer i’s per-period utility if she
chooses si for consumption can be re-written as
u(si, ri, Ei, Ep) = u(si, ri, Ei,G∗(EB, c)) (5)
≡ u˜(si, ri, EB, c)+ isi , (6)3
where u˜ is recursively written as a function of the state at the
current period.
Dropping the time subscript, we let V (ri, Ei, EB, c) denote the
value to consumer i when she is in state (ri, Ei, EB, c). The Bellman
equation that characterizes consumer i’s value function if firms and
all other consumers behave according to the MPE is
V (ri, Ei, EB, c)
= max
si
[
u˜(si, ri, EB, c)+ isi + β2Er ′i ,E′i ,c′V (r ′i , E′i , EB′, c ′)
]
, (7)
where β2 is the consumers’ discount factor, r ′i = d(si), EB′ =
H∗(EB, c), and the expectation on the right-hand side is taken
over r ′i , E′i , and c ′.10 We reserve β1 to denote the firms’ discount
factor. Because there is a continuum of consumers, an individual
consumer’s choice will not affect current prices or the transition of
the aggregate state. Therefore, froman individual consumer’s point
of view, as long as firms and all other consumers behave according
to the MPE, current prices as a function of the state will be G∗(EB, c)
and the next-period’s state will be H∗(EB, c), regardless of her own
choice.
The consumer’s policy function associated with the above
Bellman equation can be written as
si = s∗(ri, Ei, EB, c). (8)
Define V˜ (ri, EB, c) ≡ EEiV (ri, Ei, EB, c) to be the expected value
function, where the expectation is taken over the idiosyncratic
shocks E. Then V˜ (·) is given by
V˜ (ri, EB, c) = EE
{
max
si
[
u˜(si, ri, EB, c)+ isi
+β2Er ′i ,c′ V˜ (r ′i ,H∗(EB, c), c ′)
] }
. (9)
Further assume that ijt is distributed type 1 extreme value,
independent across consumers, goods, and time. Then, the
equation above can be written as
V˜ (ri, EB, c) = log
{
J∑
j=0
exp
(
u˜(j, ri, EB, c)
+β2Er ′j ,c′ V˜ (r ′j ,H∗(EB, c), c ′)
)}
. (10)
We will iterate over this functional equation to solve for the
expected value function.
2.2. Aggregate demand and supply functions
Assume that the current price vector is Ept and that consumers
anticipate the next-period’s vector of used car stocks to be EBt+1,
which is a function of the current state, EBt , and the current output
choices by the firms and will be given by the aggregate state
transition function. Consider the consumers who own a good
10 Because of the absence of transaction costs and the quasi-linearity assumption,
the per-period utility in (5) can be expressed as:
u˜(si, 0, EB, c)+ isi + γ pri ,
which implies that (7) can be written as:
V (ri, Ei, EB, c) = V (0, Ei, EB, c)+ pri .indexed by j′ at the beginning of period t . With the type 1 extreme-
value assumption on idiosyncratic shocks, among such consumers,
the proportion who choose good j for consumption in period t is
given by
Q j( j′, Ept , EBt+1)
=
exp
(
αj + γ · (pj′t − pjt)+ β2Er ′j ,ct+1 V˜ (r ′j , EBt+1, ct+1)
)
J∑
k=0
exp
(
αk + γ · (pj′t − pkt)+ β2Er ′k,ct+1 V˜ (r ′k, EBt+1, ct+1)
) , (11)
where V˜ (·) is a consumer’s expected value function.
The quantity demanded of car j in period t satisfies
qDj (Ept , EBt+1) = M ·
∑
j′=0,2,...,J:j′ 6=j
Kj′t · Q j( j′, Ept , EBt+1),
j = 1, . . . , J. (12)
The quantity demanded of car j does not include the consumers
who own car j at the beginning of the period and who choose to
keep their cars in that period. (Note that, without transaction costs,
these consumers would be indifferent between keeping their car
and trading it to repurchase it. Therefore, we could have assumed,
instead, that all consumers transact in every period.)
Similarly, the quantity supplied of used car j in period t satisfies
qSj (Ept , EBt+1) = M ·
∑
j′=0,1,...,J :j′ 6=j
Kjt · Qj′(j, Ept , EBt+1),
j = 2, . . . , J. (13)
That is, the quantity supplied of used cars j does not include the
consumers who own car j at the beginning of the period and who
choose to keep it in that period.
Together with the firms’ new car supply, the above functions
will identify the inverse demand equations and form the basis for
the market-clearing conditions in equilibrium.
2.3. Firms’ problem
There are N firms in the industry. They produce homogeneous
new cars and engage in quantity competition. Let firms’ equilib-
rium policy function be q∗(EB, c), which is the same for all firms as
we restrict our attention to symmetric MPE. Now consider firm n’s
problem. When choosing its quantity, firm n presumes that con-
sumers and all other firms behave according to the MPE. Hence, if
it produces qnt , its period-t profit is
Π(EBt , ct , qnt , q∗−nt) = qnt · (˜p1t(EBt , qnt , q∗−n(EBt , ct))− ct), (14)
where q∗−n(EBt , ct) indicates that all of firm n’s rivals choose
q∗(EBt , ct), and p˜1t(EBt , ct , qnt , q∗−n(EBt , ct)) is the first element inE˜pt(EBt , ct , qnt , q∗−n(EBt , ct)), which is the inverse demand func-
tion and is part of ( E˜pt(EBt , ct , qnt , q∗−n(EBt , ct)), E˜Bt+1(EBt , ct , qnt ,
q∗−n(EBt , ct))) and is the solution to the system of equations given
by the aggregate state transition functions and themarket-clearing
conditions
K2t+1 =
(
qnt + (N − 1)q∗−n(EBt , ct)
)
/M + (1− δ)K2t ,
Kjt+1 = δKj−1t + (1− δ)Kjt , j = 3, . . . , J,
qD1 (Ept , EBt+1) = qnt + (N − 1)q∗−n(EBt , ct),
qDj (Ept , EBt+1) = qSj (Ept , EBt+1), j = 2, . . . , J.
(15)
In this system, there are 2J−1 equations and 2J−1 unknowns.
The equations are the J− 1 aggregate state transitions for the used4
cars and the J market-clearing conditions. The unknowns are the
J − 1 next-period used car stocks and the J current prices.11
The Bellman equation that characterizes firm n’s value function
given that all other firms and all consumers behave according to
the MPE is
W (EB, c) = max
qn
[
Π(EB, c, qn, q∗−n)+ β1Ec′W (EB′, c ′)
]
, (16)
where β1 is the firms’ discount factor, EB′ = E˜B′(EB, c, qn, q∗−n(EB, c)),
and the expectation on the right-hand side is taken over c ′.
In equilibrium, the previously conjectured aggregate state and
price transition functions, H∗(·) and G∗(·), respectively, must
satisfy: H∗(EB, c) = E˜B′(EB, c, q∗n(EB, c), q∗−n(EB, c)) and G∗(EB, c) =E˜p(EB, c, q∗n(EB, c), q∗−n(EB, c)).
2.4. Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect equilibrium in the model consists of the
following functions: the price functionG∗(EB, c), the aggregate state
transition functionH∗(EB, c), the firms’ policy functions q∗(EB, c), the
firms’ value functionsW ∗(EB, c), and the consumers’ expected value
functions V˜ ∗(ri, EB, c), such that
1. Given q∗(EB, c) for all firms and V˜ ∗(ri, EB, c) for all consumers,
G∗(EB, c) and H∗(EB, c) solve the system of equations in (15).
2. Given q∗(EB, c) for all other firms, W ∗(EB, c) applied to the next
period, and V˜ ∗(ri, EB, c) for all consumers, q∗(EB, c) is the solution
to the maximization problem in (16).
3. Given G∗(EB, c), H∗(EB, c), and q∗(EB, c) for all firms, W ∗(EB, c)
satisfies the firm’s Bellman Eq. (16).
4. Given G∗(EB, c) and H∗(BE, c), V˜ ∗(ri, EB, c) satisfies the 
functional Eq. (10).
We employ the collocation method to solve for the equilibrium.
We approximate the above functions using linear combinations of 
Chebyshev polynomials (Judd, 1998; Miranda and Fackler, 2002). 
For example, if the life of a car consists of two stages, so that
EBt = K2t , the firm’s policy function q∗(·) is expressed as
q∗(K2t , ct) ≈

n∑
i=0
λ1iφ1i(K2t) if ct = c¯ − c˜,
n∑
i=0
λ2iφ2i(K2t) if ct = c¯,
n∑
i=0
λ3iφ3i(K2t) if ct = c¯ + c˜,
(17)
where for m = 1, 2, 3, φmi(K2t) is an ith-order Chebyshev
polynomial in K2t , λm = (λmi)i=0,...,n is a vector of n + 1
unknown coefficients, and n is the order of the approximation.
The expressions for G∗(·), H∗(·), W ∗(·), and V˜ ∗(·) are obtained
analogously. With the collocation method, the above functions are
evaluated at the pre-specified collocation points to check for the
equilibrium conditions.
We restrict attention to symmetric MPE and use an iterative
algorithm to compute the equilibrium.12 The algorithm takes the
11 Alternatively, one could first obtain the J − 1 next-period used car stocks using
the J − 1 aggregate state transitions, and then plug these next-period used car
stocks into the J market-clearing conditions, so that there are J unknown prices
and J market-clearing conditions.
12 While uniqueness cannot in general be guaranteed, our algorithm always
converges and results in a unique equilibrium, irrespective of the starting point and
the particulars of the algorithm.firm’s policy function q0(·), the firm’s value function W 0(·), and
the consumer’s expected value function V˜ 0(·) as its input and
generates updated functions q1(·), W 1(·), and V˜ 1(·) as its output.
Each iteration proceeds as follows. We first obtain q1(·) by solving
the maximization problem on the right-hand side of (16), taking
W 0(·) and V˜ 0(·) as given and assuming all other firms follow
q0(·). This step also produces the price function G1(·) and the
aggregate state transition function H1(·). We next obtain W 1(·),
according to (16), taking q1(·), G1(·), and H1(·) as given. We then
solve for V˜ 1(·) by iterating over the functional equation in (10),
taking q1(·), G1(·), and H1(·) as given. The iteration is completed
by assigning q1(·) to q0(·),W 1(·) toW 0(·), and V˜ 1(·) to V˜ 0(·). The
iterative algorithm terminates once the relative changes in the
policy and value functions from one iteration to the next are below
a pre-specified tolerance. The equilibrium G∗(·) and H∗(·) are then
obtained by solving the system of equations in (15) once more,
taking the equilibrium q∗(·),W ∗(·), and V˜ ∗(·) as given.
3. Parameterization
Here we present the parameter values that are used in our
baseline model. We normalize the population of consumers M to
be 1. We assume that the life of a car consists of 2 stages, new
and used, and that used cars die stochastically. We consider an
oligopoly with N = 3.13
We assume the interest rate to be 4%, which is common for
consumers and firms. This gives discount factors β1 = β2 =
1/1.04 ≈ 0.96. The depreciation parameter δ is chosen to match
the average age of cars in theUSdata. The 2001National Household
Travel Survey (NHTS) reports that the average automobile age in
the United States was 9 years. In our model, this translates into a
depreciate rate of δ = 0.11.
We choose c¯ , the constant component in the marginal cost of 
production, to equal the estimate of marginal cost (after deflating 
it) in Copeland et al. (2005) (page 28). There a marginal cost of $ 
17,693 (in 2000 dollars) is reported, which corresponds to $ 18,905 
in 2003 dollars, so we set c¯ = $19, 000.14 We let c˜ , the magnitude 
of the industry-wide cost shocks, equal 0.1 × c¯ = $1900. The cost 
shock probability ρ is set at 0.1.
We follow Chen et al. (2007) in choosing α1 (the new car 
utility), α2 (the used car utility), and γ (the consumers’ marginal 
utility of money). The calibration exercise in that paper, which is 
based on the American automobile industry over the 1994–2003 
period, finds that α1 = 2.07 and α2 = 1.40. In that paper there are 
two types of consumers in equal proportions, with marginal 
utilities of money calibrated to be 1.86 and 2.75, respectively. 
Here we set γ to be 2.31, which is the average of the two numbers. 
Table 1 reports the simulated steady state quantities and prices 
and the US market averages over the 1994–2003 period.
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values that are used in our
baseline model. The equilibrium new car production per firm, the
13 In the car industry, as inmany other durable goods industries, firms do not have
monopoly power and the oligopolistic setting is more appropriate.We also vary the
number of firms and the results are robust.
14 An alternativewould be to use themarginal cost estimates in Berry et al. (1995)
(page 882), but recent estimates are significantly lower reflecting the reduction in
marginal costs of production in the industry over more recent years.5
Table 1
Steady-state quantities and prices at calibrated parameter values
Model steady state values US data averages (1994–2003)
New vehicle sales
and leases
0.07 0.08
Used vehicle sales
and leases
0.22 0.20
New vehicle price $22,800 $23,000
Used vehicle price $9500 $9000
Table 2
Baselline parameterization
M (consumer population) 1
J (number of stages in the life of a car) 2
Discount factor (β1 and β2) 1/1.04
Probability of used car depreciation (δ) 0.11
Constant component in marginal costs (c¯) $19,000
Magnitude of cost shocks (c˜) $1900
Cost shock probability (ρ) 0.1
Number of firms 3
New car utility (α1) 2.07
Used car utility (α2) 1.40
Consumers’ marginal utility of money (γ ) 2.31
Fig. 1. Firm production, baseline model.
Fig. 2. State transition, baseline model.
state transition, the new car price, and the firms’ payoff for the
baseline parameterization are presented in Figs. 1–4, respectively,
as functions of the industry state. If a period starts with more
consumers owning used cars, we expect the demand for new cars
to be weaker and the firms’ profitability to be lower. This intuition
is confirmed by the figures, which show that a larger K2t leads to
lower new car production, lower new car price, and lower firms’Fig. 3. New car price, baseline model.
Fig. 4. Firm payoff, baseline model.
payoff. Also note that when the marginal cost of production is
below normal (that is, c = c¯ − c˜), the new car production is
higher than normal, the new car price is lower than normal, and
the firms’ payoff is higher than normal. The opposite is true when
themarginal cost of production is above normal (that is, c = c¯+ c˜).
4. Estimation bias
Our model contains dynamics on both sides of the market.
If one estimates an industry with such dynamics using a mis-
specified static model, the results will be biased. There are two
aspects to this bias. One involves the measurement of the price
elasticity of demand, which is incorrectly measured because
of estimating a static demand model. Properly accounting for
dynamic demand in estimating the price elasticities has also been
done in other papers. The second aspect is that, even if the elasticity
is measured correctly, the firms’ markup will be mis-measured if
the supply-side first-order conditions used to infer themarkup are
derived from a static model rather than a dynamic model. To our
knowledge, this aspect of the bias has not been addressed in the
existing literature.
In this section, we first simulate quantity and price data using
our dynamic durable-goods model. Next we use the simulated
data to estimate price elasticities of demand and firms’ markups.
We then compare these estimates to the model’s true values
and compute the biases. At the end of the section, we perform
robustness checks.
For each of the parameterizations considered, we let the
industry evolve T = 10000 periods according to the equilibrium
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of the model, and obtain simulated quantity and price data for 
these periods. The simulated dataset is a panel dataset consisting 
of repeated observations on the same two products (new cars and 
used cars) over time. For each period, an i.i.d. cost shock (or cost 
shifter) is generated based on (3). One example of such a cost 
shifter in the car industry would be wages of automobile workers. 
The researcher performing the static estimation observes the 
sequence of cost shifters and uses them as an instrumental variable 
(IV) to address the endogeneity problem in demand estimation due 
to the correlation of prices with unobserved product quality. In a 
static setting, the cost shocks would be an appropriate instrument 
(as in Berry (1994)). However, as we will show below, in a 
dynamic setting, these cost shocks no longer satisfy the IV 
assumptions.
4.1. Price elasticity of demand
In this subsection, we calculate the price elasticity for new
cars, first according to the dynamic model, then using the static
estimation method. In both cases, the elasticity is evaluated at Q̂ ,
the average industry new car production in the simulated data.We
then quantify the bias.
4.1.1. Elasticities in the dynamic model
In the dynamic model, the price elasticity of demand for new
cars is obtained numerically based on the system of equations
that characterizes current prices and the next period’s state as a
function of the used car stock K2 and the new car production Q . Let
K̂2 denote the used car stock that induces each firm to produce Q̂/N
when the cost shock equals zero; that is, K̂2 satisfies q∗(K̂2, c¯) =
Q̂/N . The elasticity is given by
e = p˜1
Q̂
/
∂ p˜1
∂Q̂
, (18)
where p˜1 is the first element in E˜p(K̂2, Q̂ ), which is a component of
the solution to the systemof equations given by the aggregate state
transition function and the market-clearing conditionsK
′
2 = Q̂/M + (1− δ)K̂2,
qD1 (Ep, K ′2) = Q̂ ,
qD2 (Ep, K ′2) = qS2(Ep, K ′2).
(19)
It is clear from the above systemof equations thatwhen thenew
car production changes, not only does the new car price change
in response, but the used car price also has to change. Given a
different level of new car production, if the used car price is held
fixed, then at least one of the equations in the system will not be
satisfied.
To illustrate this point, we construct an alternative ‘‘naive’’
elasticity measure, denoted η, that corresponds to the case when
the used car price is held fixed and the market-clearing condition
for the secondary market is not imposed
η = p˜1
Q̂
/
∂ p˜1
∂Q̂
, (20)
where p˜1 is the new car price which satisfies the reduced system
of equations{
K ′2 = Q̂/M + (1− δ)K̂2,
qD1 (p1, p˜2, K
′
2) = Q̂ . (21)
In these equations, p˜2 is fixed at the value which solve Eq. (10)
and not allowed to adjust as Q is varied in order to calculate the
elasticity. This naive elasticity measure η fails to recognize the
effect that new car production has on used car prices.4.1.2. Elasticities estimated using static model
From the viewpoint of the researcher performing the static
estimation, the utility of consumer i for product j in period t is given
by
uijt = wjα− γ pjt + ξjt + ijt
= α1newj + α2usedj − γ pjt + ξjt + ijt , (22)
where (1) j = 0, 1, 2 denote the outside good, new cars, and
used cars, respectively; (2)wj are observed product characteristics,
which consist of two dummies: the new car dummy newj and the
used car dummy usedj, with new1 = used2 = 1 and new2 =
used1 = new0 = used0 = 0; (3) pjt is the price of product j in
period t , with p0t = 0, for all t; (4) ξjt is the unobserved (by the
researcher) product quality in period t; and, (5) the consumers’
idiosyncratic shocks ijt are distributed i.i.d. type 1 extreme value.
In the staticmodel, consumers choose the productwhich yields the
highest static utility:
consumer i chooses product j⇔ uijt = max
j′
uij′t . (23)
With the type 1 extreme-value assumption on the idiosyncratic 
shocks, we can follow Berry (1994) to derive the estimating 
equations for the market shares, which are
yjt ≡ ln(qjt)− ln(q0t)
= wjα− γ pjt + ξjt ≡ xjtθ + ξjt , (24)
where yjt is the mean utility level of product j in period t , qjt
is product j’s observed market share in period t (recall that the
consumer population is normalized to 1), xjt = (newj, usedj, pjt),
θ = (α1, α2,−γ ), and the mean utility level of the outside good is
normalized to zero.
The researcher has a panel data set that consists of repeated
observations ofmarket shares and prices on the same twoproducts
(new cars and used cars) over time. He observes the cost shocks
vt and uses them as an instrumental variable (IV) to address the
endogeneity problem in demand estimation due to the correlation
of prices pjt with unobserved product quality ξjt .
In the framework of the static model, vt is correlated with both
the new car price and the used car price, but uncorrelated with the
unobserved product quality ξjt . Hence, it is valid as an instrument
for price. Therefore, the researcher estimates the staticmodel using
the system 2SLS estimator, with instruments vectors z1t = z2t =
(newj, usedj, vt), under the assumption that E(z′jtξjt) = 0 for j =
1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In this case, the system2SLS estimator is a
pooled 2SLS estimator, that is, it is the estimator obtained by 2SLS
estimation of (24) using instruments zjt , which are pooled across
all j and t .15 Denote this estimator by θ̂ = (̂α1, α̂2,−γ̂ ).
Using the elasticity formula for the logit case (page 63 in Train 
(2003)), the static estimate of the price elasticity of demand for 
new cars is then obtained as
ê = −γ̂ p̂1(1− Q̂ ), (25)
where p̂1 and Q̂ are, respectively, the average new car price and the
average industry new car production in the simulated data.
15 See pages 206–207 in Wooldridge (2002).7
4.1.3. Bias in static elasticity estimates
The bias in the static estimate of the price elasticity of demand
for new cars comes from two sources.
First, if the researcher assumes the static choice model (23),
but the true model is dynamic, then a missing variable in the
utility specification (22) is the expected discounted value function
β2Ed(j),ct+1 V˜
∗(d(j),H∗(EBt , ct), ct+1). Since the period t cost shock ct
is correlated with H∗(EBt , ct) (i.e., the next-period state), we know
that ct is correlated with ξjt (i.e., the expected future value of
holding car j in period t), as long as β2 > 0, that is, as long as
consumers are forward-looking. Since vt is a cost shifter and is
correlated with ct , the assumption that E(vtξjt) = 0 is violated,
and vt is no longer an appropriate instrument for prices. The bias
in γ̂ then gives rise to bias in ê. This first type of bias arises from
ignoring the possibility that consumers in durable-goods markets
are forward-looking.
2
Second, the estimate ê is obtained under the assumption 
that the used car price is held fixed even when the new car 
production varies. But in the dynamic model, given a level of 
new car production, the triplet (p1, p2, K ′ ) is jointly determined 
according to the system of Eq. (19), so that the used car price 
necessarily changes when new car production changes. When 
new car production increases, the resulting decrease in used car 
price creates stronger competition for new cars, thus shifting the 
demand curve for new cars inward and causing a larger drop in 
new car prices. Consequently, the true price elasticity of new car 
demand is smaller than it would be if used car price were held 
fixed. The static estimation fails to recognize this factor, and so 
it overestimates (in absolute terms) the demand elasticity. Note 
that this bias is present even when β2 = 0, and ct is a valid 
instrument orthogonal to ξt . This second type of bias arises from 
ignoring the possibility that firms in durable-goods markets are 
forward-looking.
Since the severity of the two types of biases should depend on
how much firms and consumers discount the future, we quantify
the biases in three sets of counterfactuals which vary β1 (the
firms’ discount factor) and β2 (consumers’ discount factor). These
counterfactuals are:
Counterfactual A: β1 fixed at 1/1.04; β2 lowered from
1/1.04 to 0
Counterfactual B: β2 fixed at 0; β1 lowered from 1/1.04 to 0
Counterfactual C: both (β1, β2) lowered from 1/1.04 to 0
For each set of counterfactuals, we computed: (i) the price 
coefficient γ ; (ii) the estimated static elasticity eˆ using Eq. (25); 
(iii) the true dynamic elasticity e using Eq. (18); and (iv) the naive 
elasticity using Eq. (20). Note that the latter two quantities are not 
estimated using the simulated data, but rather computed at the 
assumed parameter values.
Results for these three sets of counterfactuals are reported in 
Tables 3–5. Also reported are the biases in the estimates, each 
calculated as the difference between the estimate and the true 
value, divided by the absolute value of the latter. The results 
support our discussion above regarding the two types of biases and 
their sources.
First, the price coefficient γ̂ is estimated with bias, as shown 
in Tables 3 and 5. The percentage biases are small, equal to just 
2.1% in both Counterfactuals A (Table 3) and C (Table 5). Only in 
Counterfactual B (Table 4), where β2 = 0 (so that consumers are 
not forward-looking), is the bias equal to zero. Hence, the biases in 
γˆ represent the first type of bias, which arises from ignoring the 
possibility that consumers are forward-looking.
Second, across all three counterfactuals, the naive elasticity η
is larger (in absolute value) than e. Since the difference between
η and e arises from ignoring the intertemporal feedback between
new and used car prices, this finding confirms that ignoring thisfeedback leads to overestimation of the demand elasticity. The 
percentage differences between η and e range from −2% to −47%, 
with the largest coming from the baseline parameterization (in 
Table 3). Moreover, as we expect, this overestimation is more 
pronounced when β1 or β2 is larger, which shows that ignoring 
forward-looking behavior can lead to wrong conclusions that the 
demand curve for new cars is relatively elastic.
Third, we see that eˆ, the estimated static demand elasticity,
reflects both types of bias. In Table 4, we see that when β2 is
fixed at zero, which eliminates the first source of bias, ê is exactly
the same as η. However, even in this case, ê is still biased from
the true dynamic elasticity e, due to the second source of bias. In
particular, we see that ê is an overestimate of e, in absolute terms.
The percentage biases in ê range from−2% to−68%, againwith the
largest coming from the baseline parameterization.
These results show clearly that ignoring the dynamics in
durable-goods markets leads to estimates which indicate a more
elastic demand curve. Next, we see that these biased elasticities
lead to downward-biased markup measures, and to a mistaken
conclusion that these markets are more competitive than they
actually are.
4.2. Effects on markups
For our analysis of biases in markup estimates, we first
introduce a benchmarkmeasure of ‘‘true’’markups for the dynamic
model:
κ = (̂p1 − ĉ)/̂p1, (26)
where p̂1 and ĉ are the average of new car price and the average of
marginal cost in the simulated data, respectively.
In what follows, we derive an estimate of firms’ markups κˆ
using eˆ, the static estimate of demand elasticity, and then quantify
the bias κˆ − κ .
4.2.1. Markups estimated using static model
Since the researcher does not observe ĉ , he infers κ using eˆ,
his static estimate of the price elasticity of demand for new cars.
Specifically, because the researcher wrongly uses a static model,
while ignores firms’ forward-looking behavior, he mistakenly
models firm n’s profits as
pin = qn(p1(Q )− c), (27)
where qn is firm n’s new car production, andQ is the industry’s new
car production. Using the Lerner’s index, the first-order condition
(FOC) resulting from this Cournot profit function is expressed as
p1 − c
p1
= − 1
N
/
e, (28)
where 1/N is firm n’s market share due to symmetry, and e is
the price elasticity of demand for new cars. The estimate that the
researcher has for this elasticity is ê, so he obtains a static estimate
of the markup as
κ̂ = − 1
N
/
ê. (29)8
Table 3
Bias in elasticity and markup estimates - Baseline model, lowering β2 .
N δ ρ β1 β2 γ γˆ Bias (%) e η Bias (%) eˆ Bias (%) κ κˆ Bias (%) κ˜ Bias (%)
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.26 −2.1 −2.85 −4.19 −47 −4.79 −68 0.170 0.070 −59 0.117 −31
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.80 2.31 2.29 −0.7 −3.16 −4.20 −33 −4.75 −51 0.147 0.070 −52 0.106 −28
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.60 2.31 2.34 1.1 −3.56 −4.28 −20 −4.74 −33 0.123 0.070 −43 0.094 −24
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.40 2.31 2.30 −0.4 −3.95 −4.38 −11 −4.61 −17 0.105 0.072 −31 0.084 −19
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.20 2.31 2.30 −0.3 −4.26 −4.50 −6 −4.60 −8 0.094 0.073 −23 0.078 −16
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.49 −4.60 −2 −4.60 −2 0.083 0.073 −13 0.074 −11
γˆ is the estimate of γ according to the static estimation. e is the price elasticity of demand for new cars in the dynamic model. η is the price elasticity of demand for new cars
in the dynamic model, but with used car price held fixed and the market-clearing condition for the secondary market allowed to be violated. eˆ is the estimate of the price
elasticity of demand for new cars according to the static estimation. κ is firms’ markup in the dynamic model. κˆ is the estimate of firms’ markup using ehat and according
to Lerner’s index. κ˜ is the estimate of firms’ markup using e and according to Lerner’s index. Bias is calculated as (estimate− truevalue) / | true value |.Table 4
Bias in elasticity and markup estimates - Baseline model, setting β2 = 0 and lowering β1 .
N δ ρ β1 β2 γ γˆ Bias (%) e η Bias (%) eˆ Bias (%) κ κˆ Bias (%) κ˜ Bias (%)
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.49 −4.59 −2 −4.59 −2 0.083 0.073 −13 0.074 −11
3 0.11 0.10 0.80 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.47 −4.57 −2 −4.57 −2 0.079 0.073 −8 0.075 −6
3 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.46 −4.56 −2 −4.56 −2 0.078 0.073 −6 0.075 −4
3 0.11 0.10 0.40 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.45 −4.56 −2 −4.56 −2 0.077 0.073 −5 0.075 −2
3 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.45 −4.56 −2 −4.56 −2 0.076 0.073 −4 0.075 −1
3 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.45 −4.55 −2 −4.55 −2 0.075 0.073 −3 0.075 0
γˆ is the estimate of γ according to the static estimation. e is the price elasticity of demand for new cars in the dynamic model. η is the price elasticity of demand for new cars
in the dynamic model, but with used car price held fixed and the market-clearing condition for the secondary market allowed to be violated. eˆ is the estimate of the price
elasticity of demand for new cars according to the static estimation. κ is firms’ markup in the dynamic model. κˆ is the estimate of firms’ markup using ehat and according to
Lerner’s index. κ˜ is the estimate of firms’ markup using e and according to Lerner’s index. Bias is calculated as (estimate− truevalue)/ |true value|.Table 5
Bias in elasticity and markup estimates - Baseline model, lowering β1 and β2 .
N δ ρ β1 β2 γ γˆ Bias (%) e η Bias (%) eˆ Bias (%) κ κˆ Bias (%) κ˜ Bias (%)
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.26 −2.1 −2.85 −4.19 −47 −4.79 −68 0.170 0.070 −59 0.117 −31
3 0.11 0.10 0.80 0.80 2.31 2.29 −0.7 −3.10 −4.14 −34 −4.68 −51 0.135 0.071 −47 0.108 −20
3 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.60 2.31 2.34 1.1 −3.47 −4.19 −21 −4.64 −34 0.106 0.072 −32 0.096 −10
3 0.11 0.10 0.40 0.40 2.31 2.30 −0.4 −3.87 −4.30 −11 −4.54 −17 0.093 0.073 −21 0.086 −7
3 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.20 2.31 2.30 −0.3 −4.18 −4.43 −6 −4.53 −8 0.081 0.074 −9 0.080 −1
3 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00 2.31 2.31 0.0 −4.45 −4.55 −2 −4.55 −2 0.075 0.073 −3 0.075 0
γˆ is the estimate of γ according to the static estimation. e is the price elasticity of demand for new cars in the dynamic model. η is the price elasticity of demand for new cars
in the dynamic model, but with used car price held fixed and the market-clearing condition for the secondary market allowed to be violated. eˆ is the estimate of the price
elasticity of demand for new cars according to the static estimation. κ is firms’ markup in the dynamic model. κˆ is the estimate of firms’ markup using ehat and according to
Lerner’s index. κ˜ is the estimate of firms’ markup using e and according to Lerner’s index. Bias is calculated as (estimate− truevalue)/ |true value|.4.2.2. Bias in static markup estimates
The above subsection has shown that ̂e is a biased estimate of 
e, so κ̂  is bound to be a biased estimate of κ . But the bias in ̂e is 
not the only source of bias in κ̂ . We want to show that even if the 
researcher has an unbiased estimate for e, his estimate for κ will 
still be biased as long as β1 > 0, because the FOC (28) used to infer 
the markup ignores dynamics on firms’ side. To illustrate this 
point, we construct another estimate of the markup, one that uses 
the true elasticity, e, in the Lerner’s index:
κ˜ = − 1
N
/
e. (30)
Our previous analysis suggests that the bias in the static
markup’s estimates comes from two sources, the bias in the static
estimate of elasticity and the fact that the static FOC ignores
the supply-side dynamics. The mechanism for the first source is
straightforward. Regarding the second source, we note that in
the dynamic model, firm n chooses its quantity qn to maximize
pin + β1Ec′W ∗(K ′2, c ′), rather than to maximize pin. Let ψ ≡
β1Ec′W ∗(K ′2, c ′) denote the difference between the dynamic and
static profit objectives. The true first order condition is
∂(pin + ψ)
∂qn
= ∂pin
∂qn
+ ∂ψ
∂qn
= 0. (31)
We can sign the second term as
∂ψ
∂qn
= β1E ∂W
∗
∂K ′2
∂K ′2
∂qn
. (32)Since ∂W ∗/∂K ′2 < 0 and ∂K
′
2/∂qn > 0, we know ∂ψ/∂qn < 0
as long as β1 > 0, for all values of qn. This implies that
∂pin
∂qn
> 0
H⇒ p1 − c + qn ∂p1
∂Q
∂Q
∂qn
> 0
H⇒ p1 − c
p1
+ qn
Q
∂p1
∂Q
Q
p1
> 0
H⇒ κ = p1 − c
p1
> − 1
N
/
e = κ˜ . (33)
That is, even when the true elasticity is used, the static κ˜ still
underestimates the firms’ markup.
To examine the bias in the markup estimates, we again look 
at the three sets of counterfactuals with various combinations of 
firms’ and consumers’ forward-lookingness. The markup results 
are reported alongside the elasticity results in Tables 3–5.
We find that the biases in κ̂  range from −3% to −59%. The 
magnitude of the biases increases in both β1 and β2, which 
is expected, because the biases arise essentially from ignoring 
the intertemporal linkages deriving from firms’ and consumers’ 
forward-looking behavior. Even when β1 = β2 = 0 (as in the 
bottom lines of Tables 4 and 5), so that neither side of the market9
Table 6
Bias in elasticity and markup estimates - Triopoly, varying δ, ρ, and γ .
N δ ρ β1 β2 γ γˆ Bias (%) e η Bias (%) eˆ Bias (%) κ κˆ Bias (%) κ˜ Bias (%)
3 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.47 −2.0 −2.33 −3.22 −38 −3.40 −46 0.211 0.098 −53 0.143 −32
3 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.29 −0.8 −3.39 −4.56 −34 −4.89 −44 0.143 0.068 −52 0.098 −31
3 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.03 0.9 −4.41 −5.74 −30 −6.24 −42 0.108 0.053 −50 0.076 −30
3 0.05 0.10 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.49 −0.8 −2.33 −3.22 −38 −3.44 −48 0.211 0.097 −54 0.143 −32
3 0.05 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.26 −2.1 −3.06 −4.36 −43 −4.80 −57 0.151 0.070 −54 0.109 −28
3 0.05 0.10 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.00 0.1 −2.96 −4.55 −54 −5.97 −102 0.151 0.056 −63 0.113 −25
3 0.05 0.20 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.52 1.2 −2.32 −3.20 −38 −3.53 −52 0.216 0.095 −56 0.144 −33
3 0.05 0.20 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.35 1.6 −2.16 −3.45 −60 −4.78 −121 0.200 0.070 −65 0.154 −23
3 0.05 0.20 0.96 0.96 3.00 2.99 −0.3 −4.57 −5.81 −27 −6.16 −35 0.102 0.054 −47 0.073 −28
3 0.11 0.05 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.50 0.0 −1.96 −3.03 −55 −3.50 −78 0.249 0.095 −62 0.170 −32
3 0.11 0.05 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.31 0.2 −2.85 −4.18 −47 −4.90 −72 0.170 0.068 −60 0.117 −31
3 0.11 0.05 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.00 0.1 −3.66 −5.17 −42 −6.10 −67 0.132 0.055 −58 0.091 −31
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.50 0.0 −1.96 −3.03 −55 −3.50 −79 0.249 0.095 −62 0.170 −32
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.26 −2.1 −2.85 −4.19 −47 −4.79 −68 0.170 0.070 −59 0.117 −31
3 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.04 1.4 −3.65 −5.17 −42 −6.17 −69 0.131 0.054 −59 0.091 −30
3 0.11 0.20 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.49 −0.8 −1.96 −3.03 −54 −3.48 −77 0.250 0.096 −62 0.170 −32
3 0.11 0.20 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.30 −0.6 −2.85 −4.20 −47 −4.87 −71 0.171 0.069 −60 0.117 −32
3 0.11 0.20 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.02 0.7 −3.66 −5.18 −41 −6.15 −68 0.132 0.054 −59 0.091 −31
3 0.25 0.05 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.50 −0.1 −1.61 −2.56 −59 −3.34 −107 0.278 0.100 −64 0.207 −26
3 0.25 0.05 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.33 0.9 −2.47 −3.54 −43 −4.64 −88 0.181 0.072 −60 0.135 −25
3 0.25 0.05 0.96 0.96 3.00 2.96 −1.2 −3.30 −4.40 −33 −5.65 −71 0.134 0.059 −56 0.101 −24
3 0.25 0.10 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.51 0.6 −1.62 −2.57 −59 −3.37 −108 0.279 0.099 −64 0.206 −26
3 0.25 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.29 −0.8 −2.46 −3.53 −44 −4.56 −85 0.181 0.073 −60 0.136 −25
3 0.25 0.10 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.02 0.8 −3.30 −4.40 −33 −5.77 −75 0.133 0.058 −57 0.101 −24
3 0.25 0.20 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.48 −1.2 −1.61 −2.56 −59 −3.30 −105 0.278 0.101 −64 0.207 −26
3 0.25 0.20 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.32 0.6 −2.46 −3.53 −44 −4.63 −88 0.181 0.072 −60 0.136 −25
3 0.25 0.20 0.96 0.96 3.00 2.99 −0.2 −3.30 −4.40 −33 −5.71 −73 0.134 0.058 −56 0.101 −25Table 7
Bias in elasticity and markup estimates - Duopoly, varying δ, ρ, and γ .
N δ ρ β1 β2 γ γˆ Bias (%) e η Bias (%) eˆ Bias (%) κ κˆ Bias (%) κ˜ Bias (%)
2 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.47 −2.2 −2.78 −3.83 −38 −4.08 −46 0.343 0.123 −64 0.180 −48
2 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.28 −1.2 −3.77 −5.12 −36 −5.56 −47 0.249 0.090 −64 0.133 −47
2 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.07 2.2 −4.61 −6.18 −34 −7.00 −52 0.199 0.071 −64 0.109 −46
2 0.05 0.10 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.49 −0.8 −2.79 −3.83 −37 −4.13 −48 0.342 0.121 −65 0.179 −48
2 0.05 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.28 −1.4 −3.78 −5.12 −35 −5.55 −47 0.249 0.090 −64 0.132 −47
2 0.05 0.10 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.01 0.2 −4.61 −6.18 −34 −6.87 −49 0.199 0.073 −63 0.108 −46
2 0.05 0.20 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.52 1.0 −2.79 −3.84 −38 −4.22 −51 0.342 0.119 −65 0.179 −48
2 0.05 0.20 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.36 2.3 −3.76 −5.11 −36 −5.76 −53 0.250 0.087 −65 0.133 −47
2 0.05 0.20 0.96 0.96 3.00 2.97 −0.9 −4.63 −6.19 −34 −6.80 −47 0.199 0.074 −63 0.108 −46
2 0.11 0.05 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.50 0.0 −2.39 −3.63 −52 −4.26 −78 0.381 0.118 −69 0.209 −45
2 0.11 0.05 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.31 0.2 −3.26 −4.73 −45 −5.61 −72 0.274 0.089 −68 0.153 −44
2 0.11 0.05 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.00 0.0 −4.06 −5.67 −40 −6.76 −66 0.216 0.074 −66 0.123 −43
2 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.50 0.0 −2.39 −3.63 −52 −4.26 −78 0.381 0.118 −69 0.210 −45
2 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.28 −1.3 −3.26 −4.73 −45 −5.53 −70 0.274 0.090 −67 0.153 −44
2 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.05 1.6 −4.06 −5.67 −40 −6.87 −69 0.217 0.073 −66 0.123 −43
2 0.11 0.20 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.49 −0.9 −2.39 −3.63 −52 −4.22 −76 0.381 0.119 −69 0.209 −45
2 0.11 0.20 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.29 −0.7 −3.27 −4.73 −45 −5.57 −71 0.275 0.090 −67 0.153 −44
2 0.11 0.20 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.02 0.8 −4.07 −5.68 −40 −6.83 −68 0.217 0.073 −66 0.123 −43
2 0.25 0.05 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.50 −0.1 −2.01 −3.03 −51 −3.98 −98 0.391 0.126 −68 0.249 −36
2 0.25 0.05 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.33 1.0 −2.87 −3.96 −38 −5.24 −83 0.270 0.095 −65 0.175 −35
2 0.25 0.05 0.96 0.96 3.00 2.96 −1.4 −3.69 −4.78 −29 −6.22 −68 0.208 0.080 −61 0.135 −35
2 0.25 0.10 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.51 0.6 −2.01 −3.03 −51 −4.01 −100 0.391 0.125 −68 0.249 −36
2 0.25 0.10 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.29 −0.8 −2.87 −3.96 −38 −5.15 −80 0.270 0.097 −64 0.175 −35
2 0.25 0.10 0.96 0.96 3.00 3.03 0.8 −3.70 −4.78 −29 −6.37 −72 0.208 0.079 −62 0.135 −35
2 0.25 0.20 0.96 0.96 1.50 1.48 −1.3 −2.01 −3.03 −51 −3.93 −96 0.391 0.127 −67 0.249 −36
2 0.25 0.20 0.96 0.96 2.31 2.33 0.7 −2.87 −3.96 −38 −5.23 −82 0.270 0.096 −65 0.174 −35
2 0.25 0.20 0.96 0.96 3.00 2.99 −0.2 −3.70 −4.78 −29 −6.30 −70 0.208 0.079 −62 0.135 −35is forward-looking, κ̂ is still biased by−3%, resulting from a biased
estimate of elasticity, which in turn results from ignoring the
impact of new car production on used car price and the consequent
effect on new car demand.
The markup κ˜ , which uses the true elasticity in the Lerner’s
index, is found to be downward biased unless β1 = β2 = 0. The
biases range from−31% to 0%, with the baseline parameterization
yielding the largest bias at −31%. These results confirm that
if firms are forward-looking and we use the static FOC that
ignores the supply-side dynamics to infer firms’ markup, we will
underestimate the markup.4.3. Robustness checks
We perform robustness checks by varying N (the number of
firms), δ (the probability of used car depreciation), ρ (the cost
shock probability), and γ (the consumers’ marginal utility of
money). Tables 6 and 7 report the results for all parameterizations
such that N ∈ {2, 3}, δ ∈ {0.05, 0.11, 0, 25}, ρ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0, 2},
and γ ∈ {1.5, 2.31, 3}. Throughout, β1 and β2 are fixed at 1/1.04.
The results reported in Tables 6 and 7 show that when the firms
and consumers are forward-looking, the static estimates of the
elasticities and markups are substantially biased. In fact, the range
for the percentage biases is (−121%,−35%) for ê, (−69%,−47%)10
for κ̂ , and (−48%,−23%) for κ˜ . In contrast, the biases in γ̂ is small,
ranging from−2% to 2%.
Our basic conclusions above regarding the directions of the
biases are robust to different parameterizations: the static estimate
of the elasticity is an overestimate of the true elasticity, and the
static estimate of the firms’ markup is an underestimate.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct a simulation study to demonstrate 
and quantify the bias from ignoring dynamics in estimating 
models of durable-goods markets. The bias has two sources. 
The first source comes from ignoring the consumers’ forward- 
looking behavior. This first type of bias has also been a focus 
of the more recent work on estimating dynamic models of 
durable-good demand (e.g. Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2006), 
Carranza (2007), Gordon (2006), among others). The second 
source of bias derives from ignoring firms’ forward-looking 
behavior. As far as we are aware, this is the first paper that 
quantifies this second type of bias. We find that ignoring dynamics 
leads to upwardly-biased (in absolute terms) estimates of demand 
elasticities and, consequently, downwardly-biased estimates of 
markups. Furthermore, we find that, in practice, the second type of 
bias is larger in magnitude than the first type of bias. This suggests 
that a correct specification of firm behavior is crucial in order to 
draw correct policy implications for durable-good markets.
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